Consequences of the basic and most evident consistency requirementthat measured events cannot happen and not happen at the same time-are shortly reviewed. Particular emphasis is given to event forecast and event control. As a consequence, particular, very general bounds on the forecast and control of events within the known laws of physics are derived. These bounds are of a global, statistical nature and need not affect singular events or groups of events.
author" with the following words [4] , "...for me, the opinion that the [[physical]] facts and events themselves can be contradictory is a good example of thoughtlessness."
Just as in mathematics, inconsistency, i.e., the coexistence of truth and falseness of propositions, is a fatal property of any physical theory. Nevertheless, in a certain very precise sense, quantum mechanics incorporates inconsistencies in a very subtle way which assures overall consistency. For instance, a particle wave function or quantum state is said to "pass" a double slit through both slits, which is classically impossible. (Such considerations may, however, be considered as mere trickery quanum talk, devoid of any operational meaning.) Yet, neither a particle wave function nor quantum states are directly associable with any sort of irreversible observed event of physical reality.
And just as in mathematics it can be argued that too strong capacities of event forecast and event control renders the system overall inconsistent.
Strong forecasting
Let us consider forecasting the future first. Even if physical phenomena occur deterministically and can be accounted for ("computed") on a higher level of abstraction, from within the system such a complete description may not be of much practical, operational use.
Indeed, suppose there exists free will. Suppose further that an agent could predict all future events, without exceptions. We shall call this the strong form of forecasting. In this case, the agent could freely decide to counteract in such a way as to invalidate that prediction. Hence, in order to avoid inconsistencies and paradoxes, either free will has to be abandoned or it has to be accepted that complete prediction is impossible.
Another possibility would be to consider strong forms of forecasting which are, however, not utilized to alter the system. Effectively, this results in the abandonment of free will, amounting to an extrinsic, detached viewpoint.
After all, what is knowledge and what is it good for if it cannot be applied and made to use?
It should be mentioned that the above argument is of an ancient type. It has been formalized recently in set theory, formal logic and recursive function theory, where it is called "diagonalization method."
Strong event control
A very similar argument holds for event control and the production of "miracles" [5] . Suppose there exists free will. Suppose further that an agent could entirely control the future. We shall call this the strong form of event control. Then this observer could freely decide to invalidate the laws of physics. In order to avoid a paradox, either free will or some physical laws would have to be abandoned, or it has to be accepted that complete event control is impossible.
Stated differently, forecast and event control should be possible only if this capacity cannot be associated with any paradox or contradiction.
Thus the requirement of consistency of the phenomena seems to impose rather stringent conditions on forecasting and event control. Similar ideas have already been discussed in the context of time paradoxes in relativity theory (cf. [6] and [7, p. 272] , "The only solutions to the laws of physics that can occur locally . . . are those which are globally self-consistent").
Weak forcast and event control
There is, however, a possibility that the forecast and control of future events is conceivable for singular events within the statistical bounds. Such occurrences may be "singular miracles" which are well accountable within classical physics. They will be called weak forms of forecasting and event control.
It may be argued that, in order to obey overall consistency, such a framework should not be extendable to any forms of strong forecast or event control, because, as has been argued before, this could either violate global consistency criteria or would make necessary a revision of the known laws of physics.
It may be argued that weak forms of forecasting and event control amount to nothing else than the impossibility of any forms of forecasting and event control at all. This, however, needs not to be the case. The laws of statistics impose rather lax constraints and do not exclude local, singular, improbable events. and its occurrence in a test is equally likely, although its statistical property and the "meaning" an observer could ascribe to it is rather outstanding.
Just as it is perfectly all right to consider the statement "This statement is true" to be true, it may thus be perfectly reasonable to speculate that certain events are forecasted and controlled within the domain of statistical laws. But in order to be within the statistical laws, any such method needs not to be guaranteed to work all the time.
To put it pointedly: it may be perfectly reasonable to become rich, say, by singular forecasts of the stock and future values or in horse races, but such an ability must necessarily be irreproducible and secretive. At least to such an extend that no guarantee of an overall strategy can be derived from it.
The associated weak forms of forecasting and event control are thus beyond any global statistical significance. Their importance and meaning seem to lie mainly on a very subjective level of singular events. This comes close to one aspect of what Jung imagined as the principle of "Synchronicity" [8] .
Against the odds
This final paragraphs review a couple of experiments which suggest themselves in the context of weak forecast and event control. All are based on the observation that an agent forcasts or controls correctly future events such as, say, the tossing of a fair coin.
In the first run of the experiment, no consequence is derived from the agent's capacity despite the mere recording of the data.
The second run of the experiment is like the first run, but the meaning of the forecasts or controlled events are different. They are taken as outcomes of, say gambling, against other individuals (i) with or (ii) without similar capacities, or against (iii) an anonymous "mechanic" agent such as a casino or a stock exchange.
As a variant of this experiment, the partners or adversaries of the agent are informed about the agent's intentions.
In the third run of experiments, the experimenter attempts to counteract the agent's capacity. Let us assume the experimenter has total control over the event. If the agent predicts or attempts to bring about to happen a certain future event, the experimenter causes the event not to happen and so on.
It might be interesting to record just how much the agent's capacity is changed by the setup. Such a correlation might be defined from a dichotomic observable e(A, i) = +1 correct guess −1 incorrect guess where i stands for the i'th experiment and A stands for the agent A. A correlation function can then be defined as usual by the average over N experiments; i.e.,
e(A, i).
From the first to the second type of experiment it should become more and more unlikely that the agent operates correctly, since his performance is leveled against other agents with more or less the same capacities. The third type of experiment should produce a total uncorrelation.
